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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 18-3255 
________________ 
 
IN RE:  MICHAEL ELIAS STOSIC, 
 
       Appellant 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-16-mc-00190) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2019 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 8, 2019) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Michael Stosic appeals the District Court’s order denying his request for 
“clarification” of a prior order that disbarred him from the District Court.  We affirm. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. Background1 
In September 2016 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania suspended Stosic from 
practicing law for a year and a day because he repeatedly failed to represent his clients 
with diligence and professionalism.  (Report and Recommendation (“Report”) at 1–2.)  
One week after the Pennsylvania suspension took effect, the District Court ordered him to 
show cause, within 30 days, why it should not impose reciprocal discipline.  (September 
22, 2016 Order to Show Cause.)  When Stosic did not answer or respond to that order, the 
District Court issued an order to suspend him from practicing in that Court effective 
October 21, 2016.  (Id.)   
Despite the impending suspension, in mid-October Stosic represented a criminal 
defendant in a jury trial before Judge Harvey Bartle, III.  (Id.)  The trial concluded just 
three days before the District Court’s suspension took effect.  (Id.)  The defendant in that 
case, who faced a maximum sentence of 30 years’ incarceration on each of six conspiracy 
charges, was convicted on all counts.  (Id.) 
After learning that Stosic represented a criminal defendant in federal court while 
under state suspension, Chief District Judge Tucker convened a panel of three District 
Judges to determine “whether discipline should be imposed upon [Stosic], and if so to 
what degree.”  (October 27, 2016 Order.)  The panel conducted a hearing in November 
2016.  (Report at 5.)  There, Stosic—who appeared pro se—conceded the imposition of 
                                              
1 We draw the facts from a report and recommendation prepared by a three-judge panel in 
the District Court that was convened specifically to investigate alleged attorney misconduct 
by Stosic. 
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reciprocal discipline in the District Court based on his state suspension, but opposed any 
additional discipline for the failure to disclose his suspended status.  (Id. at 4–5.) 
Throughout the hearing Stosic was “flippant, smug, and otherwise inappropriate.”  
(Id. at 9.)  Stosic repeated that he did not have to tell his client of his suspension 
because—at the time of the criminal trial—he “was [still] a licensed attorney.”  (Id. at 5.)  
Stosic further offered to “take a lie detector right now that [his client] was aware” and 
said he would “bow before this court” and swear his client was “1,000 percent aware of 
everything.”  (Id.)  The panel discredited “this belated, highly dubious account.”  (Id.)  At 
the end of the hearing, the panel explained to Stosic that he had a right to object to its 
forthcoming report and recommendation; he responded, “[y]eah, I mean it’s whatever.”  
(Id. at 9.) 
Based on the November 2016 hearing, the panel determined Stosic had indeed 
failed to disclose his suspended status per the applicable ethical rules, namely 
Pennsylvania Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement 217.  (Id. at 5–6.)  But the panel 
discerned a more serious ethical violation as well:  Stosic not only failed to make the 
notifications required under Rule 217, but he also submitted a false certification of 
compliance to the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board.  (Id. at 7–9.)  The panel issued an 
order that informed Stosic of their determination that he “may not have complied fully 
with [Rule] 217” and that a violation of that Rule “could constitute separate grounds for 
the imposition of discipline.”  (November 21, 2016 Order.)  The order invited Stosic to 
either appear for a second hearing or present additional evidence on whether he complied 
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with Rule 217.  (Id.)  Stosic did not request another hearing, did not submit additional 
evidence, and did not respond to that order.  (Report at 9.)  
In a Report and Recommendation issued in January 2017, the three-judge panel 
recommended Stosic’s disbarment from the District Court.  (Id. at 11.)  The panel found 
disbarment appropriate for three reasons:  (1) Stosic failed to inform his client or Judge 
Bartle of his suspension pursuant to Rule 217; (2) he made false representations to the 
Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board; and (3) he comported himself in a “grossly 
inappropriate” manner during the November 2016 hearing.  (Id.)   
The District Court entered an order adopting the Report and Recommendation on 
March 15, 2017.  By that order Stosic was disbarred from the District Court.  (March 15, 
2017 Order.)  Thereafter the Commonwealth disbarred Stosic from the practice of law in 
Pennsylvania as reciprocal discipline based on his disbarment in the District Court.  (Pet’r 
Br. at 15.)  
On September 20, 2018, more than a year and a half after he was disbarred in the 
District Court, Stosic filed a motion for “clarification” of the three-judge panel’s January 
2017 Report and Recommendation.  (Pet’r Br. at 5.)  The motion sought clarification on 
whether his District Court disbarment was reciprocal to the Pennsylvania suspension or 
was instead “original” discipline for distinct ethical violations.  (Pet’r Br. at 4–5.)  
District Judge Diamond summarily denied that motion the same day it was filed.  
(September 20, 2018 Order.)  
Stosic asks us to review the District Court’s denial of his motion for clarification.  
(Pet’r Br. at 2.)  He also contends he was deprived of procedural due process during his 
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disciplinary proceedings in the District Court because the three-judge panel did not file 
formal charges, create a separate docket, give notice of a hearing, or give notice of 
possible non-reciprocal sanctions.  (Pet’r Br. at 20.)   
II. Discussion 
As his primary argument on appeal, Stosic claims the District Court should have 
granted his request for “clarification” of whether his order of disbarment was original or 
reciprocal discipline.  (Pet’r Br. at 2.)  He does not identify any statute or other authority 
that would entitle him to “clarification” of that order.  Nor does he explain the procedural 
framework that governs our review of the District Court’s denial of his motion for 
clarification of that order.  Construing Stosic’s submission to us generously to find a 
procedural hook for it, see United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir. 1999), we 
consider his submission first as an appeal from an order denying a motion for 
reconsideration, see United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003), and 
second as a petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the District Court to clarify its 
prior order, see In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2000).  
To the extent we review Judge Diamond’s September 2018 order as a denial of a 
motion for reconsideration, we perceive no error.  In the District Court, a party may move 
for reconsideration “within 14 days after the entry of the judgment, order or decree 
concerned.”  Local R. Civ. P. 7.1(g).  It disbarred Stosic in March 2017, yet he did not 
seek clarification of the order until September 2018, well over a year later.  Hence the 
motion was properly denied as untimely.  
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To the extent we review Stosic’s appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus, we 
likewise do not grant relief.  Writs of mandamus are used “to confine an inferior court to 
a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority 
when it is its duty to do so.”  In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quotation omitted).  Stosic does not argue the District Court exceeded the scope of its 
authority; rather, he appears to contend the Court failed to discharge a duty to issue a 
clarification of its prior order upon his request.  We reject that contention.  Although a 
district court may in some circumstances entertain a motion for clarification to resolve an 
ambiguity in a prior order, see, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d at 168, 
Stosic has not shown the District Court had any duty to do so here.   
Moreover, the District Court’s order of disbarment is not ambiguous.  It clearly 
states that Stosic’s disbarment was premised on (1) his failure to notify his client and 
Judge Bartle of his state suspension, and (2) the evidence gathered through the panel’s 
hearing on November 10, 2016.  At no time does the order reference reciprocal discipline 
or the ethical violations that underpinned Stosic’s state suspension.  Further, the well-
documented proceedings that led to the disbarment confirm that the District Court’s 
discipline was not reciprocal:  during and after the November 10 hearing, the panel 
explicitly told Stosic that his false certification to the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board 
could “constitute separate grounds for the imposition of discipline.”  Viewed in the 
context of the full District Court record, there is no doubt that the Court’s order of 
disbarment imposed “original” discipline.  
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Finally, we are not troubled by the procedure employed by the District Court to 
reach its decision to disbar Stosic.  In November 2016, Chief Judge Tucker ordered a 
three-judge panel to determine whether Stosic should be disciplined for failing to disclose 
his state suspension.  The order made clear the panel would investigate ethical conduct 
distinct from that underlying Stosic’s state suspension.  Indeed, although Stosic conceded 
the imposition of reciprocal discipline, he expressly contested further discipline related to 
his failure to provide notice.  In doing so, Stosic implicitly recognized the possibility that 
separate sanctions could result from his nondisclosures.  The panel’s inquiry during the 
November 10, 2016 hearing further confirmed that it was considering the need for 
discipline that went beyond the existing state suspension.  And, after the hearing, the 
panel issued an order expressly notifying Stosic that he “may not have complied fully 
with Pennsylvania Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement 217.”  (November 21, 2016 Order.)  
The order informed Stosic that a violation of Rule 217 “could constitute separate grounds 
for the imposition of discipline.” (Id. (emphasis added).)  The panel invited Stosic to 
appear for another hearing or to present additional evidence on whether he complied with 
the Rule.  But Stosic passed on that invitation; he neither requested the second hearing 
that was offered nor presented any additional evidence.  He thus does not give any 
specific reason to believe these procedures were inadequate.    
In this context, we affirm. 
